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Chapter 6 
Occupation and Democracy in Re-Colonial Iraq 
The images we possess of the current political situation in Iraq are somewhat 
distorted. To be sure, kidnapping, political violence and sabotage of oil 
facilities are ongoing and present a serious threat to political stability … 
However, there is another reality that has been largely ignored by the Western 
media. Very little mention has been made of the myriad examples of Iraqis 
who, since the fall of Saddam and the Baath, have been actively involved in 
civic life – such as establishing municipal councils, publishing newspapers 
and journals, and forming artistic organizations – and who are committed to 
working for democratic change. (Davis 2005a: 241) 
The Discourses of Democracy and the Re-Colonisation of Iraq 
On 17 March 2003, President Bush addressed the United States and the world, offering Saddam 
Hussein an ultimatum: he and his sons were to leave Iraq within 48 hours or the coalition would 
launch its ‘pre-emptive strike’ (Bush 2003a). Despite the fact that by the eve of the war the 
notion of a military intervention in Iraq was demonstrably unpopular across the globe, Bush 
fulfilled his promise, stating on 19 March 2003 that 
At this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military 
operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from 
grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected 
targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to wage 
war. (Bush 2003b) 
However, when it was discovered that the initial motives for entering Iraq – Saddam’s alleged 
stockpile of WMD and his links to Al-Qaeda – were grievous intelligence errors, the Bush 
administration began to spin the war’s rasion d’etre and redefine the parameters of victory. A 
central tenet of this approach was to begin speaking about democracy as if it had always been 
one of the aims of the war itself. In a speech presented before the National Endowment for 
Democracy in November 2003, President Bush claimed that although bringing democracy to 
Iraq would be a 
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massive and difficult undertaking – it is worth our effort, it is worth our 
sacrifice, because we know the stakes. The failure of Iraqi democracy would 
embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the American 
people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy 
will succeed – and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to 
Teheran – that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of 
a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the 
global democratic revolution. (Bush 2003c) 
The notion that the US could use its enormous influence and military power to not only 
pre-emptively attack independent nation-states and overthrow existing regimes, but also to 
install democratic governments in their place is exclusive to the former administration and has 
come to be termed the ‘Bush doctrine’ (Jervis 2003). In addition, the Bush administration also 
held the overly simplistic view that by installing democracy in Iraq they would enable a 
‘domino effect’ across the region where autocratic regimes would have no choice but to convert 
to robust democracies. In a sense, the Bush doctrine can be seen to be reminiscent of the 
Colonial era in that it claims to be a civilizing force aimed at liberating the barbaric non-
Western world from Oriental despotism. It also taps into the discourse of Western democracy by 
asserting that the United States and the broader Western world is the legitimate legatee of 
democracy and has the right to democratize – under military force and occupation if necessary – 
the non-Western world. 
That Iraq could become a democracy was widely ridiculed by the international news 
media, however, as well as by prominent academics, senior policy-makers and bureaucrats. 
Senior civil servants who worked with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which 
governed Iraq during the earliest days of the occupation expressed very serious doubts about 
Iraq as a potential democracy. These included eminent figures such as Rory Stewart, who, in 
2003–04, was the deputy coordinator of Maysan and later a senior advisor in Dhi Qar. In his 
Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing in Iraq, Stewart suggests that Iraq is particularly 
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unique in the broader story of human civilization because of its lack of democratic potential. He 
writes: 
I had never believed that mankind, unless overawed by a strong government, 
would fall inevitably into violent chaos. Societies were orderly, I thought, 
because human cultures were orderly … But Maysan made me reconsider. A 
secure and functioning government was not emerging of its own accord. 
(Stewart 2006: 81) 
Here, Stewart seems to suggest that Iraq is a nation predisposed to violence, chaos and 
despotism and incapable of tolerance, inclusion and peace. The further implication here is that 
these problems are so unparalleled that one could even question the humanity of the Iraqi 
people. If ‘mankind’ or ‘human cultures’ are orderly and peaceful, and Iraq is naturally violent 
and disorderly, then the conclusion must be that this is not a human culture at all (Isakhan 
2010a). 
Similar sentiments emerged in a great deal of scholarly literature that attempted to explain 
why the establishment of democracy will at least be difficult, if not impossible in Iraq. In 2003 
Andreas Wimmer ominously warned that ‘the seeds of democracy may have difficulties to 
germinate in the sandy soils of Iraq’ (Wimmer 2003: 111). Others claimed that Iraq has ‘little 
tradition of power-sharing’ (Byman 2003a: 57) or ‘experience with democracy’ (Benomar 2004: 
95). There was said to be no ‘society in Iraq to turn into a democracy’ and that the people had 
not ‘learned democratic practices’ (Byman 2003a: 59). Iraq had been a nation of ‘uneasy order 
maintained through rations of oppression and fear’ (Benomar 2004: 95). Daniel Byman offered 
a list of factors that he believed would inhibit the spread of democracy in Iraq including, among 
others, ‘a lack of cohesive identity to unify Iraq’s different communities … bellicose elites who 
pursue adventurism abroad and whip up tension at home, a poorly organized political 
leadership, and a lack of a history of democracy’ (Byman 2003b: 49). What is particularly 
interesting here is that these scholars chose to use words like ‘tradition,’ ‘society,’ ‘identity’ and 
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‘history’ to suggest that Iraq has long been home to a stagnant culture that is inhospitable to 
diversity, debate and difference. 
Along similar lines, the Western media coverage of the democratization of Iraq not only 
emphasized the ongoing violence and the disagreements between Iraq’s various ethno-religious 
groups, but also argued that Iraq simply lacked the social and political prerequisites necessary to 
build towards a democratic form of government (Isakhan 2007b, 2008a). Once again, Iraq was 
seen as ‘a society riven by centuries of religious and ethnic conflicts with little or no experience 
with representative institutions’ (Kissinger and Shultz 2005). Iraqis were ‘not used to 
democracy … [with] little tradition of tolerance’ (Australian 2006); they were trapped in a 
barbaric world in which ‘violence remains the more pragmatic way to achieve justice and to 
protect one’s interests’ (Clemons 2005). This uncritical and careless adoption of Orientalist 
ideologies is clearly problematic and stems from the notion that even when given democracy 
and freedom, the people of the Middle East are too backward and barbaric to embrace a future 
free of tyranny and despotism. Here, any examples of collective forms of government, 
egalitarian societies or democratic political movements within Iraqi history are all but eschewed 
in favour of clichés of despotism, ineptitude and violence. 
The convergence of such bureaucratic, scholarly and media discourse in the Re-Colonial 
period is startling in its familiarity. It mirrors and indeed draws upon the vast array of discourses 
that were employed in the Colonial period in Iraq and elsewhere, utilizing the same language of 
Oriental backwardness and the need for Western dominance. This is not altogether surprising 
given that the effort to invade and occupy Iraq cannot be wholly disentangled from a Colonial 
project which saw the West only begrudgingly relent its subjugation of the non-European world 
during the last two centuries. Or perhaps the project of Colonialism should be understood not so 
much as having come to an end (a direct affront to the curious prefix of ‘post’ in ‘post-Colonial 
studies’), but as having momentarily subsided as Western powers regrouped and devised new 
economic, military, and ideological mechanisms of power. As several scholars have recently 
noted, the invasion and occupation of Iraq might best be described as ushering in what is 
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referred to here as Re-Colonial Iraq (2003–11) (Gopal and Lazarus 2006, Gregory 2004, 
Lazarus 2006, Spencer 2006). Such theoretical work was pre-empted by Tariq Ali who argued 
that the invasion and occupation of Iraq not only represents the re-colonisation of this particular 
sovereign nation-state by Western powers, but also marked a return to the broader Colonial 
project ‘that was disrupted by the twentieth century and is now back on course’ (Ali 2003: 185). 
As the central aim of the project being undertaken here is to problematize and scrutinize 
Orientalist discourse via a closer examination of Iraq’s history, this chapter seeks to re-interpret 
the post-Saddam period and the alternative discourses of democracy emanating from within Re-
Colonial Iraq. It builds on the preceding chapters by detailing the complex public sphere of the 
post-Saddam era and points to the inclusive nature of the positive developments that have 
occurred across the nation since 2003. The first part discusses the post-Saddam media landscape 
which has played a positive role in covering the nation’s difficult transition to democracy. The 
second part of this chapter documents and examines the Iraqi people’s exercise of their 
democratic right to protest and the influence these protests have had on the politics of the post-
Saddam era. The chapter concludes that Iraqi citizens who play an active role in their own 
governance and participate in democratic mechanisms such as elections and mass 
demonstrations are helping to create a more robust democracy. 
Elections and the Public Sphere 
With the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, Iraq’s media environment was changed forever. 
Almost overnight it transformed from being Saddam’s tightly controlled propaganda machine to 
one of the most diverse media environments on earth. By the middle of 2003, Iraq was home to 
more than 20 radio stations, around 15 Iraqi-owned television stations, with approximately 200 
Iraqi-owned and run newspapers published across the country. Even smaller regional towns 
such as Najaf boasted more than 30 newspapers in a city of only 300,000 people. Most of these 
new television stations, radio stations and newspapers were started by the seemingly countless 
political parties, religious factions and/or ethnic groups of post-Saddam Iraq, each of them 
jostling for support and legitimacy in the nation’s struggle from despotism to democracy 
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(Cochrane 2006). As Ibrahim Al-Marashi points out, the Iraqi media sector has witnessed the 
rise of various ethno-religious sectarian and highly partisan ‘media empires’ which have 
evolved into ‘quite a pervasive element in Iraq’s Fourth Estate’ (Al-Marashi 2007: 104). 
Foremost among these are those controlled by the major Kurdish political parties (the PUK and 
the KDP) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), those controlled by the two largest 
Shia parties, Dawah and SCIRI, and Shia religio-political movements like the Sadr Trend, as 
well as those owned by key Sunni, Christian, Turkomen and other ethno-religious groups. There 
are also those controlled by smaller political parties like the ICP, the INA and the INC. These 
publications have been joined by those which claim to be free of any specific political, religious 
or sectarian allegiance but which desire to report the news in a professional and objective 
manner.1 
Several problems have accompanied Iraq’s divergent, ad-hoc and highly volatile media 
landscape. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to detail each of these, it is worth 
mentioning that some of the more serious factors include: the absence of an appropriate legal 
framework; the ongoing dangers faced by journalists whose death toll continues to climb;2 the 
uneven quality and dubious professionalism of some media organizations; and the interference 
in Iraq’s media by various regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran), the occupying forces 
(particularly the US and UK), as well as by the Iraqi government and the KRG (Isakhan 2009b). 
                                                 
1 Earlier work by the author includes a more detailed overview of the post-Saddam Iraqi media landscape (Isakhan 
2006: 136-46, 2008b, 2009b: 10-2), including a set of detailed tables that document the most significant outlets 
(Isakhan 2009a: 257-75). 
2 Iraq remains one of the most dangerous nations for the press as is demonstrated by the Annual Report of Paris-based 
Reporters Sans Frontieres (‘Reporters Without Borders’) which designated Iraq as having a ‘Very Serious Situation’ 
in terms of press freedom since 2003 until it was downgraded in the 2010 report to a ‘Difficult Situation’ (‘Annual 
Report and Press Freedom Index’ 2009, 2010). As with the death toll of the overall Iraq War, however, the number of 
Iraqi journalists killed since 2003 increases daily making reliable and up-to-date figures difficult to ascertain. 
Arguably the best, and certainly the most chilling, accounts of civilian casualties in Iraq also concern the coalition 
efforts to cover up the carnage (Hil and Wilson 2007, Otterman and Hil 2010). 
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Despite these manifold problems, there are several reasons to be optimistic about the 
contemporary media landscape of Iraq. First among these is the fact that the Iraqi media can be 
seen to have played an overwhelmingly positive role – despite their inherent biases – in 
fostering the emergence of a renewed public sphere in Iraq. They have been instrumental in 
serving the number of functions that a free press is expected to perform in a nascent democratic 
order like post-Saddam Iraq. 
This role began as far back as February 2004, when the Iraqi media began to offer its 
views on the Interim Governing Council’s (IGC) deliberations over a temporary constitution. In 
a plethora of opinion pieces and news articles across Iraq’s divergent media, the nation’s 
journalists were generally critical of US involvement. This included interference from the head 
of the CPA, Lewis Paul Bremer, especially his attempt to avoid any reference to Islamic law in 
the wording of the constitution itself. Others implored the IGC to avoid the temptation to skew 
the wording of the constitution in favour of their own interests or those of their particular ethno-
political group. As Abd-Al-Munim Al-Aasam opined in Azzaman, 
All those who have gathered around the conference table to discuss the draft 
interim constitution … would do well to rule out any possibility of coming up 
with anything tailored so as to be in full harmony with their own views. They 
are duty-bound to put aside the unworthy ploy of threatening to rouse the 
public into civil war in a bid to have their own ideas incorporated in the 
constitution. Any such practice would run counter to the reality of the 
political, ethnic, religious and sectarian diversity that is characteristic of Iraq. 
(Al-Aasam 2004) 
When campaigning for the January 2005 election began on 15 December 2004, information 
about it almost immediately ‘permeated every part of the Iraqi media, providing at least the 
show of a nascent democracy in action’ (Usher 2005b). Throughout the campaign period Iraqi 
radio stations, newspapers, television channels and websites played a critical role in not only 
promoting certain political parties and their stated ideologies and agendas, but also in 
encouraging Iraqis to defy the insurgent and terrorist threats and take part in the election 
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(Dawisha 2005b: 38). Throughout the electoral campaign the German government funded a 
daily half hour broadcast that covered various aspects of the election. They selected 25 young 
Iraqi journalists (all under the age of 30) and provided training for them in neighbouring Jordan. 
These young journalists then returned to Iraq to seek out stories relating to the election which 
were broadcast on Iraqi stations such as the independent Radio Dijla (‘Tigris’), and the KDP’s 
Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as being made available for download on the internet. Over the 
course of the campaign these short broadcasts included profiles of politicians, political parties 
and the various coalitions that emerged in post-Saddam Iraq as well as comment by foreign 
election observers (Usher 2004). In addition to these half hour broadcasts Radio Dijla also ran 
its regular programming which encouraged Iraqis to phone-in and offer their opinion on the 
elections as well as quiz shows that posed questions such as: ‘Which is better, a pre-set 
democratic model or one that is in harmony with Iraq’s culture?’ (Radio Dijla cited in Usher 
2005b). 
Iraq’s leading television stations, the state-run Al-Iraqiya, and the privately owned Al-
Sharqiya (‘The Eastern One’) and Al-Diyar (‘The Homeland’), led the domestic television 
market. They screened campaign advertisements ranging from the techno-savvy efforts of 
groups such as Allawi’s Iraqi List and the coalition of Shia groups known as the United Iraqi 
Alliance, through to the hackneyed efforts of the smaller parties (Usher 2005b). All three of 
these channels worked in the public interest by disseminating information regarding the 
curfews, restrictions and security measures that had been placed across the nation in the lead up 
to the election. Al-Iraqiya aired statements by Iraq’s religious leaders urging Iraqis to vote and 
provided the kind of access to the political elite rarely seen in even the most highly esteemed 
Western media (Misterek 2005). For example, it broadcast a weekly phone-in programme 
hosted by the incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, who answered unscreened calls 
from Iraqis keen to discuss various issues with their leader and air their frustrations (Usher 
2005b). 
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As the election drew closer, Iraq’s print media played an increasingly important role in 
raising and discussing several key issues related to the forthcoming election. The independent 
Al-Dustour published a collection of in-depth articles including those critical of the incumbent 
Iraqi government, those which provided details of some of Iraq’s various smaller political 
factions, those which countered rumours about the election, those which discussed the thorny 
issue of religion and politics and those which called for peace and unity (Al-Shaykh 2005a, 
2005c, 2005e, 2005f, 2005g, Jamil 2005, Zaydan 2005a, 2005b). On the issue of whether or not 
the elections should be postponed, a wide range of views and opinions were expressed in papers 
as diverse Azzaman, the INC’s Al-Mutamar, Iraqi Hezbollah’s Al-Bayynah (‘The Evidence’), 
the Dawah party’s Al-Bayan (‘The Dispatch’ or ‘The Manifesto’) and the eponymous Dawah 
party paper, Al-Dawah (Al-Muqdadi 2005, Al-Pachachi 2005, Al-Raziqi 2005, Al-Shimmari 
2005, Al-Ubaydi 2005, Humadi 2005, Khudayyir 2005, Rasul 2005b). Meanwhile, Kurdish 
papers such as the independent Hawlati, the PUK’s Kurdistani Nuwe (‘New Kurdistan’) and the 
KDP’s Xebat (‘Struggle’), ran a collection of stories both before and after the election that 
detailed the various Kurdish concerns and developments, such as the issue of federation, 
Kurdish regional elections, unity among the many different people of Kurdistan and the future 
status of Kirkuk (Hawlati 2005a, 2005b, Kurdistani Nuwe, 2005a, 2005b, Xebat 2005a, 2005b). 
The Iraqi press also fostered a lively and diverse discussion on the merits and tenets of 
democracy. Various Shia backed organs, such as Dawah’s Al-Bayan and SCIRI’s Al-Adala 
(‘The Justice’), published several articles that were often unrestrained in their optimism. Of 
these, the Shia papers are adamant that the Iraqi people must not miss this great opportunity to 
‘pave the way for the rise of the rule of law, in which democracy, freedom, security, and 
sovereignty will prevail’ (Al-Juwari 2005). As if to capture this enthusiasm and summarize 
these sentiments, an editorial which appeared just days before the election in Al-Bayan stated: 
The countdown has begun for a great, historic day in the life of our people. On 
this day, the people will master their own destiny and future when they will 
select their representatives to the constitutional assembly that will draft the 
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permanent constitution and choose an elected government expressing their 
will and working to achieve their hopes and aspirations. The responsibility for 
making this election a success does not rest only with the government or the 
electoral commission that will supervise and ensure a fair vote. Rather, it 
depends, above all, on our people through their broad participation, with all 
their sects, ethnic groups, political forces and social categories. We believe the 
high turnout will be the most telling response to the terrorists and killers who 
seek to confiscate Iraqi people’s will. With it, they will tell those terrorist they 
are much more stronger than their criminal means. (Al-Bayan 2005b) 
Similar sentiments can be found across the pages of the INC’s Al-Mutamar, where writers such 
as Shaykh Ali Abd-Al-Husayn Kammunah implored the citizens of Iraq to take part in the ‘great 
democratic process for which we have waited long and offered dear sacrifices’ (Kammunah 
2005). Similarly, Nabil Al-Qassab argued that the election would foster Iraqi unity and 
‘guarantee the rights of all sects, ethnic groups, and nationalities’ (Al-Qassab 2005). Al-
Mutamar seems to have been such a strong advocate of the elections that it appeared to view 
them as something of a silver bullet, capable of rectifying all of Iraq’s complex problems. 
Consider the words of Salman Al-Shammari who wrote that 
not only are the Iraqi elections a positive step on the path leading to 
shortening the occupation’s life and solving the political problem in Iraq and a 
positive and good initiative to boost and deepen the principles of democracy, 
plurality, and rule of law in the country, but they are also the key and main 
way to get rid of the security and economic crises that Iraq suffers from. (Al-
Shammari 2005) 
The independent press of Iraq seemed to largely follow his line of argument. Much of the 
coverage in Al-Dustour emphasized the need for national unity, with Ibrahim Zaydan opining 
that ‘In order to build a pluralist, democratic Iraq, as we hope, we have to open the doors for 
participation to everybody because Iraq is home to all Iraqis, rather than to a particular sect, 
ethnic group, tribe or religion’ (Zaydan 2005b). To some degree this was echoed by the chief 
editor of Al-Dustour, Basim Al-Shaykh, who claimed that Iraq needed to seek ‘God’s help and 
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rise up as one man with their hands united to place the voting card deciding their destiny in the 
ballot box holding their aspirations for tomorrow’ (Al-Shaykh 2005b). However, Al-Dustour’s 
coverage also came with a stern warning to those who would manipulate the Iraqi elections or 
the broader body politic to suit their own ends. ‘Let it be known from now on’ begins another 
piece by Al-Shaykh, 
that the average Iraqi will tolerate no mandate other than that dictated by his 
own conscience. Advocates of fake heavenly agendas had better steer away 
from Iraq and Iraqis, for we have had enough at the hands of opportunists 
touting bright religious and nationalist slogans. Let them seek their fortune 
elsewhere, for we have made a solemn vow to root out anyone stalking our 
beloved Iraq, regardless of their race or colour and no matter how dazzlingly 
bright their banners may be. (Al-Shaykh 2005c) 
It is not surprising that the various independent papers, as well as those controlled by the Shia 
and Kurdish parties or the INC and INA were relatively optimistic about the January elections, 
given that they each had much to gain politically. Less optimistic were the Sunni journals which 
represented the increasingly disenfranchised minority which had ruled Iraq since its inception in 
the 1920s. A little over a week before the election, the Sunni organ of the Association of 
Muslim Scholars, Al-Basair (‘The Insight’), expressed its concerns regarding the forthcoming 
election which included the ‘insufficient legal and technical preparations, lack of security, the 
occupation forces’ total domination of security, and most important of all, they aim at 
legitimizing the occupation of Iraq’ (Al-Basair 2005). This issue is raised in several articles in 
the same issue of Al-Basair. Prominent Iraqi writer Karim Latif Al-Dulaymi referred to the Iraqi 
elections as ‘a poisonous honey’ which has been ‘given by the US to Iraq in order to legitimize 
the occupation of the country’ (Al-Dulaymi 2005). 
In terms of the watch-dog function of the media, the well-respected Kurdish newspaper 
Hawlati took the unrivalled step of publishing the list of candidates on the Democratic Patriotic 
Alliance of Kurdistan in the lead up to the election itself. What made Hawlati’s move 
significant was that not only had no other media published such a list due to security concerns, 
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but also that about a dozen Kurdish candidates were former Baathists (Glantz 2005). Other 
newspapers waited until after the election to raise their concerns. In mid-February 2005 Iraq’s 
Azzaman published an unofficial list of the candidates elected to the Iraqi National Assembly 
while several other newspapers continued to publish their concerns about the make-up of the 
post-election assembly (Al-Adala 2005, Al-Bayan 2005a, Al-Mutamar 2005b, Azzaman 2005). 
Iraq’s highbrow independent paper Al-Mada (‘The View’) controversially accused the Iraqi 
Council of Commissioners of having pre-defined the number of seats and percentages for 
political entities which would go on to form the National Assembly following the election (Al-
Mada 2005b). 
Despite such serious concerns, immediately following the January election much of Iraq’s 
diverse media landscape expressed almost unanimous praise for the conduct of the elections and 
their significance for the future of the nation. The jubilance of many Iraqi journalists was 
splashed across the pages of several important newspapers (Al-Bayan 2005d, Al-Bayynah 2005, 
Al-Mada 2005a, Al-Mutamar 2005a, Al-Sanduq 2005, Baghdad 2005). As just one example, Al-
Bayan printed the following comment on the election, 
It was a historic day in the life of our people. On this day, Iraqis taught the 
peoples of the region a great lesson in democracy. The first winner and victor 
in these elections is, beyond any doubt, the Iraqi people. This, in itself, is quite 
enough for all those who contributed to writing this national epic to feel 
proud. It is, indeed, a remarkable feat added to Iraqi civilization records. (Al-
Bayan 2005c) 
However, it did not take long for the Iraqi press to begin lobbying the newly elected Iraqi 
government regarding various concerns and issues which it saw as central to the success of the 
new Iraq (Al-Bayynah 2005, Al-Tikriti 2005, Rasul 2005a). What Iraq needed now, according to 
Rida Al-Zahir of Tariq Al-Shab, was ‘national accord among the political forces that believe in 
democracy to build the country’ (Al-Zahir 2005). This would not only ‘see an end to the US 
occupation’ as Riyadh Abu Mulhim put it in an article published by Al-Mutamar, but enable 
‘the constitutional institutions required to guarantee that Iraqis will get the sort of government 
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they yearn for, free of sectarian bias and representative of the nation’s cultural makeup’ 
(Mulhim 2005). Another major concern of Iraqi journalists was that of the culture of corruption 
that had been pervasive throughout government institutions under the Baathist regime (Al-
Baldawi 2005, Al-Mashriq 2005, Zaki 2005). On this issue Al-Dustour’s Basim Al-Shaykh 
implored the new administration to ‘purge government departments and security offices of the 
lingering corrupt practices inherited from the past’ (Al-Shaykh 2005d). 
This close monitoring of Iraqi state politics by the nation’s media was to continue at the 
time of the country-wide referendum which effectively ratified the Iraqi Constitution in October 
2005. Not only did the Iraqi media, across its rich array of formats and persuasions, play a 
critical role in disseminating the draft constitution in the lead up to the referendum, but 
television stations such as Al-Sharqiya also hosted a phone-in programme to discuss the finer 
details of the document, while various newspapers discussed the constitution’s merits and 
drawbacks (Al-Ansari 2005, Al-Shahid 2005). One of Iraq’s more influential Islamist papers, 
Al-Adala, also featured an editorial which argued that the ratification of the constitution was 
itself indicative of the fact that 
Iraqis have defeated their enemies: terrorists, dark forces and those who dream 
of a return of the unfair equation. What has been achieved for Iraq would not 
have seen the light of day had it not been for the sacrifices by Iraqis and their 
friends. The time of coercion and pressure has gone for good, and the time of 
freedom and democracy has come. Democracy and freedom have been created 
in Iraq by all the honourable men in the world who have stood by Iraq in its 
ordeal, offering all that is dear to them. (Khlayf 2005) 
In December 2005, as Iraqis prepared to nominate a permanent government, Iraq’s media 
landscape once again buzzed with the excitement of the looming election. Newspapers across 
Iraq were awash with political advertising and long articles explained the complexity of Iraq’s 
various political coalitions as well as providing details of polling stations and how to vote. 
Iraq’s television stations took the unprecedented step of offering free political advertising, 
which immediately saw a series of non-partisan and well-produced, if rather emotive, short 
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films screened which encouraged Iraqis to participate in the election. Less emotive were the 
government-funded advertisements which also gave details of how to vote as well as the 
location of polling booths. The free airtime meant that many of Iraq’s smaller minorities and 
political factions were able to broadcast their own amateur advertisements, although they did 
complain that they were not given equal airtime and were simply unable to compete with the 
larger parties and coalitions (Usher 2005a). Despite such complaints, the fact that every 
legitimate political party in Iraq had access to free airtime on the nation’s state-run television 
channel indicates the degree to which the Iraqi media served as a locus where the general public 
had ready access to a diverse range of political opinion, policy and debate (Dawisha and 
Diamond 2006: 97). 
Despite the free advertising, most of Iraq’s TV stations took a decidedly biased stance in 
the lead up to the elections. For example, both Al-Sharqiya and Al-Iraqiya, which had 
previously been lauded for their professional and objective reporting, were unwavering in their 
support of the incumbent government of Iyad Allawi and his ministers, repeatedly airing his arty 
black-and-white commercials (Al-Marashi 2007: 109, Usher 2005a). The SCIRI-owned Al-
Furat on the other hand, revealed its deeply partisan nature by refusing to offer free airtime or 
screen paid advertisements from political parties other than the United Iraqi Alliance (which 
was a reincarnation of the January 2005 Unified Iraqi Coalition) (Al-Marashi 2007: 109, Usher 
2005a). The Sunni parties also managed to have a voice in the December elections via their 
newly established Baghdad satellite channel. Having suffered the consequences of boycotting 
the January election, many of the various Sunni political movements formed the Al-Tawafuq 
Front in 2005 and quickly set about establishing the channel. In a bid to counter the clearly 
partisan nature of their rival stations, Baghdad only featured advertisements for the Al-Tawafuq 
Front in the lead up to the December election (Al-Marashi 2007: 111). 
Following the December 2005 elections, a six-month political stalemate emerged among 
the various political entities as to exactly what the new Iraqi government should look like and 
who should hold the key positions of power. This impasse was eventually resolved with 
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Dawah’s little known Nuri Al-Maliki nominated as Prime Minister, his government finally 
taking office in May 2006. Although the many divisions on the path to forming a government 
were resolved peacefully, this short period of divisiveness set the tone for political infighting 
and was a forerunner to the sharp upsurge in ethno-religious motivated sectarianism and 
violence that was to follow. Over the next two years Iraq descended into a particularly dark and 
unprecedented period in which ethno-religious factions, who mostly lived in peaceful co-
existence, waged bitter and deadly battles against each another (Isakhan 2012c). 
Consequently, this became a central concern for the Iraqi press who covered and 
criticized the unfolding conflict, demonstrating not only journalistic standards of the highest 
order but also remarkable bravery. As just one example, Azzaman was very critical of the mass 
ethno-religious violence that was tearing Iraq apart, and held to account the Iraqi government, 
various sectarian politicians and the militias they controlled (Abbas 2007, Al-Shaboot 2007, 
Maraai 2006a, 2006b). What was most significant about the Iraqi press of this time, however, 
was the connection so many journalists drew between the violence and the type of democracy 
that the US had imposed on Iraq. They condemned virtually every aspect of the US occupation: 
the failure to foster political solutions and reconciliation, the subsequent violence it had 
fostered, the troop surge of 2007, as well as the merits and drawbacks of a complete US 
withdrawal (Al-Khafaji 2006, Allo 2007, Sami 2006). Perhaps the most virulent, articulate and 
consistent criticisms on the pages of Azzaman, however, came from its Editor-in-Chief, Dr Fatih 
Abdulsalam3 (Abdulsalam 2006b, 2007a, 2007c, 2007e, 2007f). In a nuanced account of post-
Saddam Iraq, Abdulsalam reserved much of his critique for the Iraqi government which he 
viewed as being in complete disarray (Abdulsalam 2006a, 2007b). He denounced Iraq’s 
politicians who he saw as stubborn, ineffective, corrupt and held hostage to religious clerics. For 
                                                 
3 Abdulsalam is an Iraqi author and academic, as well as being the Editor-in-Chief of the International Edition of the 
London-based Arabic daily newspaper, Azzaman. Formerly, Dr Abdulsalam worked in Iraq as a professor of modern 
Arabic literature and criticism at the University of Mosul.  
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Abdulsalam this was ‘an embarrassing situation because none of the influential political factions 
is ready to compromise despite the fact that the country is imploding’ (Abdulsalam 2007d). 
While much of 2006 and 2007 was particularly grim, the US troop surge of 2007 and the 
increasing efficiency of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) – among a host of other factors – did see 
increased stability and security across Iraq by 2008. This meant that the nation was relatively 
peaceful when Iraqis went to the polls in January 2009 for Iraq’s provincial elections in which 
some 400 parties and 14,500 Iraqi candidates registered to compete. As with the lead up to the 
2005 national elections, the Iraqi press went to great lengths to provide details on the various 
parties and candidates and to encourage the Iraqi people to vote. Among the many Iraqi news 
outlets, Aswat Al-Iraq (‘Voices of Iraq’) stood out for the quality, objectivity and neutrality of 
its reporting. Throughout this period Aswat Al-Iraq lived up to its name, airing the voices of 
Iraqis of all backgrounds and shades of opinion. The paper frequently included commentary 
from experts and analysts of Iraqi politics, representatives of the various political parties, 
University professors, writers, artists and poets, key figures like Nuri Al-Maliki and Jalal 
Talabani and everyday ‘man on the street’ interviews (Aswat Al-Iraq 2009c). It also included 
the voices of the most marginalized Iraqis – women, the disabled, and tiny ethno-religious 
minorities like the Yazidis (Aswat Al-Iraq 2008b, 2009f, 2010c). 
Aswat Al-Iraq also did an excellent job of promoting the elections across Iraq. To this 
end, they focused much of their coverage on the Sunni-dominated parts of Iraq in order to avoid 
a repeat of the mass Sunni electoral abstinence of 2005 (Aswat Al-Iraq 2008a, 2009e). In other 
parts of Iraq, such as the Shia-dominated south, Asawt Al-Iraq interviewed a host of Iraqi poets, 
authors, artists and intellectuals in Basra who were very positive about the 2009 provincial 
elections, seeing them as an opportunity for change. Among them, Iraqi author Abdilghafar Al-
Itwi argued that 
This electoral round is important, because it would affect the path of 
democracy … From now on, being [a] member in the provincial council will 
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not be an easy issue to be achieved, as it would rely on providing services to 
people (Al-Itwi cited in Aswat Al-Iraq 2009b). 
Others demonstrated an intimate awareness of the problems plaguing Iraqi politics. One Iraqi 
political writer, Abdulameer Al-Mijar, pointed out that sectarian politics had created a political 
elite in Iraq who had failed to adapt to the evolving nature of political consciousness in 
designing and articulating their key policies and in crafting their rhetoric. As he put it, in the 
elections of 2005, ‘Shiites voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, Kurds for Kurds’ but today, the 
Iraqi people ‘want parties and entities that serve them, not those that represent part of their 
identities’ (Al-Mijar cited in Aswat Al-Iraq 2009d). Along similar lines, Iraqi writer and 
political analyst, Gomaa Al-Halafi, stated that while ‘The coming elections are considered as an 
important move in the democratic and constitutional life in Iraq’ the ‘Big parties which took 
part in the previous elections still dominate the political life in Iraq and have the money and 
means, including ways that violate the elections law’ (Al-Halafi cited in Aswat Al-Iraq 2009a). 
Such concern was certainly warranted as the elections did see many familiar faces return to 
power with Nuri Al-Maliki’s recently formed State of Law Coalition (SLC) winning a 
considerable proportion of the votes. 
Just over a year after the provincial elections, in March 2010, Iraq held its next round of 
national polls. Once again, the Iraqi press did an excellent job of covering the lead up to the 
vote, demonstrating their ability to serve as the Fourth Estate of this fledgling democracy. 
Beginning in October 2009, journalists discussed a plethora of issues facing Iraqi democracy 
and did not recoil from writing about some of the harder aspects of the electoral process. 
Abdallah Al-Sukuti, writing in Al-Mada, argued that ‘the gruesome massacres we are 
witnessing’ are part of a broader insurgent plot ‘to get serious about derailing the approaching 
Iraqi public elections’ (Al-Sukuti 2009). Others blamed the violence on the Iraqi government, 
with Fatih Abd-Al-Salam of Azzaman arguing that the situation has been ‘created by a persistent 
political failure to come up with a vision of the future that can make the necessary shift from the 
language of liquidation, eradication, assassination’ to a democratic culture of the ‘open-minded 
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inclusiveness required to salvage Iraq from sinking forever’ (Abdulsalam 2009). As Sabah Al-
Lami put it in the independent Al-Mashriq (‘The Arab East’), 
We have to realize that the forthcoming elections … will either save Iraq from 
the deteriorations of the 2003 invasion and the 2005 elections or turn the 
country into a graveyard for democracy as a cheap compensation for all its 
suffering … Iraq’s plight is the result of non-existent political stability and 
lack of ideological wisdom at the levels of both government and opposition. 
(Al-Lami 2009) 
As the election drew closer, the Iraqi press continued to host varying opinions about the 
challenges and prospects of democracy in Iraq. Aswat Al-Iraq included opinions by leading 
experts that were very optimistic about Iraq’s elections. The published comments by Kirkuk’s 
deputy governor, Adwar Uraha claimed: ‘The increase in the number of electoral lists is a kind 
of the new democratic practice and … This multiplicity is an indicator of the society’s diversity 
and the development of the citizens’ mentality’ (Uraha cited in Aswat Al-Iraq 2010e). 
Elsewhere, Bassem Saheb of the Iraqi Communist Party stated that ‘The elections were a 
national occasion to congratulate our people on their success with this great performance. It 
proved that Iraqis are a civilized people who are able to overcome pain and to reach the rank of 
democratic country in a short stage’ (Saheb cited in Aswat Al-Iraq 2010f). 
Similarly, in a series of articles published in PUK Media, Qubad J. Talabani correctly 
predicted that ‘We will likely see shortly some close outcomes, potentially leading to disputed 
results … This will create tension within the system and delays will result’. For Talabani, 
however, this is ‘merely the sign of a country continuing the difficult transition from oppression 
to democracy’ (Talabani 2010b). In another article, published shortly after the election, Talabani 
continued this line of thought by claiming that 
the post-election coalition building will serve as a critical test of Iraq’s fragile 
democracy and will continue to affect more than just the country’s political 
future … Iraq can take significant strides towards democratic governance if it 
adheres to the country’s constitution … What cannot be overlooked is what 
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the majority of eligible Iraqi voters want their country to be – a stable, 
prosperous, federal democracy. (Talabani 2010a) 
These astute observations proved to be true. On the one hand, the Iraqi people had certainly 
demonstrated their will towards a democratic future, again risking their lives to vote in Iraq’s 
latest round of elections while on the other hand the obstinacy and incompetence of many of 
their elected representatives failed to encourage the mutually beneficial dialogue and debate 
critical to democracy. This saw the nation plummet into nine months of political stalemate. 
Inevitably, the Iraqi media became very critical of the impasse and of Maliki in particular, 
urging the various political entities to put their differences aside and make progress (Aswat Al-
Iraq 2010a). To this end the PUK Media published an editorial by Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid in 
which he offered the following scathing critique of the incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister, 
We do not understand what has afflicted Al-Maliki to cause him to raise all of 
these obstacles, especially as there is no clear victor that would be able to 
form a government on their own … Do not forget that this was an open 
election that was overseen by bodies that Al-Maliki’s government put in place 
and found acceptable, and th[at] the elections results that did not produce a 
clear victory was ratified by them. Perhaps a candidate not winning a majority 
is in the interests of Iraq as this is something that forces the politicians to work 
together over the next four years as a team and form a government that 
represents everybody, rather than there being a majority ruler who issues 
orders. This will be a difficult task for the next Prime Minister of Iraq, but this 
is a good balance, especially for Iraq at its current stage of political 
maturation. (Al-Rashid 2010) 
It is worth noting how Al-Rashid moves from critiquing Maliki and the political stalemate to 
arguing that the failure to form a majority government could actually serve to improve Iraqi 
democracy. Other Iraqi commentators have also argued along these lines, suggesting models by 
which the impasse might be resolved. A particularly popular option of this period was for Iyad 
Allawi to form a strong opposition party (Amin 2010). Despite such suggestions for the 
resolution of Iraq’s political stalemate, the deadlock continued until early November when an 
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agreement was signed that confirmed Maliki as Prime Minister and paved the way for the 
formation of a government (Ottaway and Kaysi 2010). The Iraqi press reacted immediately. 
Sadiq Hussein Al-Rikabi in the independent Al-Akhbaar (‘God is Great’) was grateful that Iraq 
finally had a government, ‘The whole world was watching a unique democratic experiment … 
most Iraqis see it as a nice dream that at long last could usher in an era of stability, prosperity 
and reconstruction’ (Al-Rikabi 2010). On the other hand, authors such as Mahdi Qassim of Sot 
Al-Iraq were not nearly as optimistic: 
We are going to have a surreal government, with two leaders who are all too 
eager to lock horns with each other … As usual, the victims of this anticipated 
ram fight are, of course, going to be ordinary, vulnerable and harmless Iraqis 
… So congratulations to the people of Iraq on another four bleak years. 
(Qassim 2010) 
Civil Rights and Protest Movements 
Paralleling this series of free and fair elections and their coverage in the Iraqi press, the Iraqi 
people frequently exercised their democratic right to protest. Such protests date back to the 
earliest days of the occupation and were first sparked by American plans to install a puppet 
government in Baghdad and disavowing the result of grass roots Iraqi elections (Isakhan 
2011a). In April 2003, immediately after the fall of Baghdad, Iraq witnessed a series of 
spontaneous elections not dissimilar to those that followed the end of the First World War. In 
northern Kurdish cities such as Mosul, in majority Sunni Arab towns like Samarra, in prominent 
Shia Arab cities such as Hilla and Najaf, and in the capital, Baghdad, religious leaders, tribal 
elders and secular professionals called town hall meetings where representatives were elected 
and plans were laid for local reconstruction projects, security operations and the return of basic 
infrastructure. These initiatives were initially supported by the occupying forces and there are 
records of US troops playing a facilitating role in the process (N. Klein 2007: 362). 
Much like the Colonial period under British occupation, however, the US was quick to 
quell these Iraqi-led drives towards democratization and to exert its own hegemony over Iraq. 
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Fearing that the Iraqi people would elect certain ‘undesirables’ such as military strongmen or 
political Islamists, Bremer instead decided that he would appoint the members of the Interim 
Iraqi Government (IIG). Consequently, by the end of June, he had ordered that all local and 
regional elections be stopped immediately (N. Klein 2007: 363–5). This effectively meant that 
any decisions made by local councils were revoked and the mayors and governors who had been 
elected by their own constituents were replaced by hand-picked representatives including 
former Baathists (Booth 2003, Booth and Chandrasekaran 2003). 
Such moves were widely unpopular across Iraq. In the Shia holy city of Najaf, hundreds 
of peaceful protestors took to the streets demanding that their installed mayor be removed and 
replaced by an elected representative. Several protestors carried placards reading ‘Cancelled 
elections are evidence of bad intentions’ and ‘O America, where are promises of freedom, 
elections and democracy?’ (cited in Booth and Chandrasekaran 2003). Much larger 
demonstrations were conducted in Baghdad and Basra where thousands banded together to 
chant the words, ‘Yes, yes, elections. No, no selections’ (cited in Hendawi 2003). 
These early protests were but a precursor to a movement – particularly among the Shia 
Arab population of Iraq – that gathered enormous momentum over the ensuing months. Senior 
religious figures such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani4 were able to mobilize thousands of 
Iraqis in protests that called for a general election prior to the drafting of the Iraqi constitution. 
Al-Sistani, a member of the quietist branch of the Shia faith took the unprecedented step of 
issuing a politically-motivated fatwa (edict) in June 2003 which argued that the US lacked the 
appropriate authority to install a government in Iraq and demanded that they hold national 
elections so that the Iraqi people could nominate their own representatives. The fatwa read: 
Those [US] forces have no jurisdiction whatsoever to appoint members of the 
Constitution preparation assembly. Also there is no guarantee either that this 
assembly will prepare a constitution that serves the best interests of the Iraqi 
                                                 
4 The Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, is the pre-eminent Shia cleric or marja in Iraq and has been since 
1992.  
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people or express their national identity whose backbone is sound Islamic 
religion and noble social values. The said plan is unacceptable from the outset. 
First of all there must be a general election so that every Iraqi citizen who is 
eligible to vote can choose someone to represent him in a foundational 
Constitution preparation assembly. Then the drafted Constitution can be put to 
a referendum. All believers must insist on the accomplishment of this crucial 
matter and contribute to achieving it in the best way possible. (Al-Sistani cited 
in Feldman 2005: 6) 
Although the Coalition Provisional Authority at first underestimated the importance of such a 
fatwa, it ultimately had a profound effect on US plans for post-Saddam Iraq, as they were now 
forced to appease Sistani’s demands. The US put in place an unelected transitional assembly 
with no guarantee of lasting power in Iraq and no power to write the constitution. Instead, the 
assembly would pave the way for national elections in January 2005 which would in turn see an 
elected body responsible for drafting the Iraqi constitution. Although this was a significant 
compromise for the world’s last remaining superpower to make to a religious figure in Najaf, it 
was not enough for Sistani who demanded that the US seek UN approval for their plan. 
Incredibly, even though the entire world – including pleas from America’s closest ally, the UK 
– had been unable to bring the US before the United Nations, Sistani succeeded (Feldman 2005: 
7–8). 
This was still not enough for Sistani, however, who wanted guarantees that the US would 
not further delay or manipulate Iraqi democracy. To bolster his argument and demonstrate its 
popularity among the Iraqi Shia majority, in mid-January 2004 the cleric called for the faithful 
to protest. More than 100,000 Shia marched through Baghdad while a further 30,000 took to the 
streets of Basra to demand democracy (Walker 2005). They called on the US occupation forces 
to conduct free and fair national elections that would enable the people of Iraq to nominate an 
Iraqi legislature. They waved flags and chanted, ‘Yes, yes to unification! Yes, yes to voting! 
Yes, yes to elections! No, no to occupation!’ (cited in Jamail 2004). Some carried banners with 
slogans such as ‘We refuse any constitution that is not elected by the Iraqi people’, while one 
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protestor told reporters that ‘If America won’t give us the democracy they promised, we will 
make it for ourselves’ (cited in Jamail 2004). Demonstrating the power of the cleric these 
protests remained peaceful according to his instructions and when he announced that he had 
agreed to wait for a UN Fact-finding Team to study the situation, the protestors disbanded as 
quickly as they had assembled (Finn 2004). 
Sistani’s pro-democracy campaign continued in the lead up to the January 2005 elections 
for a transitional government. This time, Sistani issued another series of politically-motivated 
fatwas urging his clergymen to get involved in local politics and encouraging the faithful, 
including women, to protest key decisions and vote in elections (Al-Rahim 2005: 50). Sistani 
also played a critical role in uniting the divergent political factions of the Iraqi Shia population – 
including Sadr, ISCI and Dawah – under the banner of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). 
Reasoning that a greater involvement of the Shia Arab majority in Iraqi politics would rectify 
the power imbalance that had swung in favour of the Sunni Arab minority since the inception of 
the state in 1921, Sistani understood that bringing the varying Shia factions together would 
enable them to wield significant power (Duss and Juul 2009: 11). 
Paralleling the pro-democracy movements of Al-Sistani were those of the younger, more 
radical, Moqtada Al-Sadr5 who was to gain both notoriety and political influence following the 
invasion. Arguably this began when the CPA forced the closure of two newspapers produced by 
Al-Sadr, prompting thousands of protestors to gather at the paper’s office in central Baghdad. 
The protestors chanted slogans such as ‘No, no, America!’ and ‘Where is democracy now?’, and 
vowed to avenge Al-Hawza’s closure (Al-Shaykh 2004, Gettleman 2004). In an ironic twist, it 
was the forced closure of Al-Hawza, rather than anything printed across its pages, which 
ultimately garnered a renewed reverence for Al-Sadr among his followers and arguably incited 
his Mahdi Army to violence (Al-Marashi 2007: 132). 
                                                 
5 Moqtada Al-Sadr has no formal religious training, his popularity comes from the fact that he is the son of Grand 
Ayatollah Mohamad Sadiq Al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the Baath in 1999. 
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Throughout 2004 Al-Sadr led several military uprisings against the occupation forces and 
Sunni insurgents. His fire-brand rhetoric and military action quickly earned him immense 
popularity among the poor, the dispossessed and the devout Shia underclasses, particularly in 
Baghdad. They helped refine his mastery of anti-occupation political rhetoric and distinguished 
him against Al-Sistani as a strong militant religious leader who had both the strength and 
courage to take on the United States. As Patrick Cockburn puts it Al-Sadr ‘is the Messianic 
leader of the religious and political movement of the impoverished Shia underclass whose lives 
were ruined by a quarter of a century of war, repression, and sanctions’ (Cockburn 2008: 199). 
When his military campaigns consistently failed, however, Al-Sadr employed a new set of 
weapons in his struggle against the occupation from 2005 onwards. These included a dramatic 
shift in approach from armed resistance to (mostly) non-violent political struggle, an evolution 
in rhetoric that saw him change from fire-brand pro-Shia Islamism to one who called for 
tolerance, national unity and social inclusion, and the effective transformation of the Mahdi 
Army from a militia to a social welfare organization (Yaphe 2008: 3). In Sadr city, the political 
arm of his organization, the Sadr Trend (or Sadrist Movement), began to organize their own 
religious courts, conduct law enforcement operations, set up prisons and initiate a range of 
social services including the supply of potable water, health care and food distribution. 
As part of this shift, Al-Sadr, following in the footsteps of Al-Sistani, began to capitalize 
on his enormous support base, which he regularly mobilized in co-ordinated protests across 
Iraq. On the second anniversary of the invasion of Iraq (April 2005), Al-Sadr orchestrated 
massive protests in Baghdad. His supporters marched the five kilometres from Sadr city to 
Firdos square where, in 2003, the US had torn down the giant bronze statue of Saddam in an 
attempt to look like the liberators and not the invaders of Iraq. Thousands travelled from all over 
the nation to attend these peaceful protests making them one of the largest political rallies in 
Iraqi history (Jasim 2005). They chanted anti-occupation slogans while a statement read on 
behalf of Al-Sadr claimed, ‘We want a stable Iraq and this will only happen through 
 25
independence … There will be no security and stability unless the occupiers leave … The 
occupiers must leave my country’ (cited in Al-Khairalla 2005b). 
Of particular interest was Al-Sadr orders to his followers to wave only Iraqi flags and not 
those of the Mahdi Army or other Shia Arab organizations. This was a clear attempt to move the 
protests beyond a pro-Al-Sadr, Shia-backed movement to more of a nationalist struggle against 
occupation – something which would appeal to Iraqis of all persuasions. Consequently a 
number of Sunni Arabs and a small contingent of Iraqi Christians also attended the Baghdad 
protests. In the Sunni city of Ramadi the Association of Muslim Scholars coordinated 
concurrent protests attended by around 5,000 protestors (Carl 2005). These massive anti-
occupation protests, organized by Al-Sadr, have become an ongoing annual event in Iraq with 
successful and largely peaceful demonstrations being conducted each year since 2005. Al-Sadr’s 
followers have also organized several other demonstrations concerning more pragmatic 
problems: in the Sunni-dominated city of Samarra hundreds of Al-Sadr’s followers have 
repeatedly demonstrated against the lack of basic infrastructure and public services such as 
electricity, fuel, potable water, the high cost of ice and the increasingly bleak employment 
market. 
As well as these protests, Al-Sadr has further demonstrated his keen political instincts and 
acute knowledge of democratic mechanisms. In 2005, he instructed his followers to collect the 
signatures of one million Iraqis in a petition that asked the US and Coalition troops to leave the 
country immediately. This continued in March 2008 when Al-Sadr launched a nation-wide civil 
disobedience campaign in response to a series of raids targeting the cleric’s offices and the 
subsequent arrest of a number of members of his organization. In several key Baghdad 
neighbourhoods, including Mahmoudiya and Yusufiya, members of the Mahdi Army marched 
peacefully, while in Abu Disher the streets were emptied, stores closed and schools vacated in 
protest (Tawfeeq, Wald, and Sterling 2008). Then in October 2008, thousands of Iraqis took to 
the streets of Sadr city and in the south-eastern province of Missan in support of Al-Sadr’s 
concerns about the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which had been negotiated by the US 
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and Iraqi governments in 2008 and which would see the final withdrawal of all US forces by 31 
December 2011. When the Iraqi Government ignored their protests and signed the deal, Al-
Sadr’s followers re-appeared in the streets and one of his senior supporters read a message from 
the cleric stating that, 
This crowd shows that the opposition to the agreement is not insignificant and 
parliament will be making a big mistake if it chooses to ignore it … The 
government must know it is the people who help it in the good and the bad 
times. If it throws the occupier out, we will stand by it. (cited in Chulov 
2008). 
More recently, in early 2011, Al-Sadr spoke at a number of politico-religious rallies co-
ordinated by his followers and attended by thousands of Iraqis (Al-Jazeera 2011a, Shadid 2011). 
In a style that has become the hallmark of Al-Sadr’s campaign, he called on the crowd to resist 
US occupation ‘through armed, cultural and all kinds of resistance’, chanting slogans such as 
‘no, no to occupiers’ (Al-Sadr cited in Al-Jazeera 2011b). At the same time, however, he also 
called for peace and unity between Iraqis and, referring to the brutal civil war of earlier years, 
pleaded with his followers: ‘Whatever happened between brothers happened, but that page must 
be forgotten and turned forever’ (Al-Sadr cited in Muir 2011). 
The key reason the Shia Arab protests have been so effective is that they make up the 
majority of Iraq’s population whereas the Sunni Arabs (around 20%), the Kurds (around 20%) 
and the Iraqi Christians (around 3%) simply cannot command such impressively large 
demonstrations. Nonetheless, these smaller minorities have also been able to utilize the power 
of the streets in order to air their concerns and advocate political change. The Sunni Arab 
minority conducted some of their earliest protests in the form of general strikes in resistance to 
US blockades of Sunni cities. In Ramadi the entire town shut down for two days as US troops 
launched a major offensive across the Sunni region. As Sheikh Majeed Al-Gaood described it, 
‘a call came from the mosques for a general strike in Ramadi and neighboring towns. Schools, 
markets and offices shut down in protest at the blockade’ (Al-Gaood cited in Assaf 2005). The 
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Sunni Arab protests were to gather increased momentum as the former ruling minority found 
itself increasingly ostracized by the Shia Arab and Kurdish dominated central government. In 
2005, Sunni Arab demonstrations were held in the towns of Hit, Ramadi, Samarra and Mosul to 
protest the US and Iraqi Government plan for a nation-wide referendum in October 2005 that 
was designed to ratify the Iraqi constitution drawn up by the government. The Sunnis felt that 
they had had little say in the creation of the constitution and took to the streets en masse to air 
their concerns (Nasr 2005). In northern cities such as Kirkuk and Mosul the Sunni Arabs have 
frequently taken to the streets in protests against what they see as the Kurdish domination of 
Nineveh’s regional administration (Nourredin 2005). In 2008 the Sunni Arab population of the 
Baghdad suburb of Adhamiyah protested against moves by the Kurds to incorporate the oil 
province of Kirkuk into the autonomous Kurdish region (Agence France Presse 2008). 
At around the same time, the Kurds were also conducting their own protests regarding 
Kirkuk. Thousands gathered in cities such as Sulaymanyah, Arbil, Kirkuk and Dohuk after the 
Iraqi Parliament passed a law that would see a power-sharing arrangement devised for 
Kurdistan’s multi-ethnic cities. In both Sulamanyah and Dohuk, the protestors submitted a 
warrant of protest to the UN Secretary General, the Iraqi President, the President of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Parliament, asking the law to be revoked 
(Voices of Iraq 2008b, 2008c).The Kurds have also rallied against the inequities they see across 
their own region. During both March and August of 2006, and more recently in August of 2008, 
a series of largely peaceful demonstrations broke into angry protest against the KRG and its 
failure to provide basic public services to the region (Hama-Saeed 2007, Ridolfo 2006). 
Caught in the political and sectarian cross-fire of post-Saddam Iraq, smaller ethno-
religious minorities, such as the Turkomen, the Faili Kurds (Shiite Kurds) and the Christian 
minority of Iraq (made up mostly of Syriac-speaking Assyrians and Chaldeans) are often 
forgotten alongside the three larger ethno-sectarian groups. Unfortunately, these small Iraqi 
minorities have been the victims of much violence and harassment with many having left the 
country in fear of their lives. They have nonetheless been politically active with some minor 
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successes such as their inclusion in various political coalitions, the creation of a small number 
of media outlets and a handful of political protests staged since 2003. In 2008, hundreds of Iraqi 
Christians demonstrated across key towns in northern Iraq including Qosh, Karabakh, Tell-
esqope and Dohuk. The protesters chanted slogans and carried banners expressing their 
indignation at being denied the chance to elect their own representatives in the provinces in 
which they lived. They also called for autonomy in their ancestral homeland. The President of 
the Assyrian-Chaldean-Syriac Council, Jameel Zito, spoke to the crowds stating, ‘Our rights to 
elect our own representation has been denied therefore we demand our right to self-government, 
because this is the only way to ensure our rights in our homeland’ (Zito cited in Hakim 2008). 
However, not all of the protests of post-Saddam Iraq have been conducted along ethno-
religious lines. Iraq has also seen a variety of civil movements emerge that are not so much 
concerned with issues regarding ethno-religious rights, resistance to the occupation or a 
rejection of state policy, but rather the plight of normal Iraqi citizens – ordinary people who 
demand better working conditions, higher salaries, safer environs and better infrastructure. 
While many of these protests have occurred in very specific ethno-religious areas and are at 
times made up entirely of one particular ethno-religious group, the main impetus of these 
protests is the people’s struggle for a more inclusive and equitable future. The Iraqi people have 
repeatedly protested against corruption and nepotism in their local and national governments 
and called for the resignation of several senior officials (Al-Jazeera 2008, Voices of Iraq 2008a). 
Women’s rights have also become a particular concern in post-Saddam Iraq with Iraqi 
women of all ethnicities and religious persuasions initiating their own powerful protest 
campaigns since the 2003 US invasion. Several women’s rights and social justice activists have 
joined forces in a group known as ‘Women’s Will’ that has organized a boycott of the US goods 
which have flooded the Iraqi market since the invasion. One of the leaders of the group is 
reported to have argued: 
We are now living under another dictatorship, you see what kind of 
democracy we have, seems more like bloodocracy. You see what kind of 
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liberation they brought: unemployment, murder and destruction. We must 
resist this, it is the right of any occupied people to resist. Especially the 
women, we can use the simplest weapons of resistance, a financial boycott. 
(cited in Carr 2005) 
Similarly, June 2005 saw massive protests organized by various Islamic human rights and 
women’s rights organizations in Mosul which pressed for the immediate release of all Iraqi 
women in US custody. So effective was this campaign that the US was forced to release 21 Iraqi 
women in Mosul who had been held as a bargaining chip against relatives suspected of 
resistance against US forces (Al-Din and El-Yassari 2005). Both during and after the 2010 
elections, women’s rights became a major issue when several women’s groups highlighted the 
various challenges women face, especially in terms of safety, and their gross 
underrepresentation in Iraqi politics (Aswat Al-Iraq 2010b, 2010d, 2010g). 
As well as protests against corruption, nepotism and women’s rights, in recent years, Iraq 
has also seen a collection of powerful workers’ movements emerge. Iraqi doctors, nurses, taxi 
drivers, university staff, police, customs officers and emergency service personnel have 
repeatedly used non-violent protests, strikes, sit-ins and walk-outs. They have done so in order 
to draw attention to important issues such as their poor working conditions, the interference they 
are subjected to from various forces, the pressures under which they work, unfair dismissals, 
ineffectual government regulation and the dangerous nature of their jobs (Al-Dulaimy and 
Allam 2005, Al-Khairalla 2005a, Assaf 2005, Hassan 2005). 
Perhaps the best examples of civil protest in Iraq have been those coordinated by the 
nation’s largest and most powerful independent union, the General Union of Oil Employees 
(later renamed the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions [IFOU]). The union is led by President Hassan 
Jumaa Awwad Al-Asady and has over 26,000 members. The IFOU really began to flex its 
political muscles in May 2005 when it held a conference against the privatization of Iraq’s oil 
industry. Aiming directly at certain Iraqi politicians complicit in US plans to privatize Iraqi oil, 
the conference called upon ‘members of Parliament … to take a firm stand against political 
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currents and directives calling for the privatization of the public sector in Iraq’ (cited in Uruknet 
2005). In June 2005, some 15,000 workers conducted a peaceful 24 hour strike, cutting most oil 
exports from the south of Iraq. This particular strike was in support of demands made by Basra 
Governor Mohammad Al-Waili that a higher percentage of Basra’s oil revenue be invested back 
into the region’s deplorable infrastructure. At the time, Al-Waili was quoted as saying that, 
‘Faced with a pathetic and unjust situation, our moral responsibility leads us to demand in the 
name of our people a fair share of resources’ (Al-Waili cited in Global Resistance News 2005). 
The IFOU also demanded the removal of 15 high ranking Baath loyalists in the Ministry of Oil 
as well as a salary increase for the workers (BBC 2005). 
Two years later, in May 2007, the IFOU threatened to strike again, but this was delayed 
when a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki resulted in the formation of a 
committee tasked with working on finding solutions acceptable to both sides. When the 
government failed to deliver on any of its promises, however, the oil workers went on strike 
across southern Iraq, bringing an immediate halt to the free flow of oil products, kerosene and 
gas to much of the country. A few days later, the Iraqi government responded by issuing arrest 
warrants for leaders of IFOU including Awwad in an attempt to clamp down on industrial 
action. At the time, Sami Ramadani (who runs IFOU’s support committee in the UK) pointed 
out that, issuing a warrant for the arrest of the oil workers leaders is an outrageous attack on 
trade union and democratic freedom. In the face of such intimidation the union held firm, taking 
the bold step of closing the main distribution pipelines, including supplies to Baghdad. After 
several days of meetings and much political deliberation, Awwad released a statement which 
claimed ‘Finally the workers have won in demanding their legitimate rights … And after 
deliberations … the two sides agreed to halt the strike and to use dialogue in dealings to resolve 
the outstanding issues’ (Awwad 2007). 
Throughout 2010 and into 2011 all of these divergent aspects of Iraq’s various protest 
movements have converged. Religious figures, political parties, women’s groups and civil rights 
movements have banded together in a series of protests that have been a great demonstration of 
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the Iraqi people’s understanding of the mechanisms of democracy. In the middle of 2010, as the 
government deadlock continued and Iraqis sweltered in the heat of summer with only sporadic 
electricity to fuel their air conditioners and poor access to drinking water, frustrations literally 
reached boiling point. Several protests and sit-ins erupted across Iraq, the largest and longest of 
which were held at Nasiriyah and Basra. These protests prompted Nuri Al-Maliki to send a 
delegation to Basra in order to look into the problem, but he remained adamant that electricity 
officials should be the ones held accountable for the shortages, leading Iraq’s electricity 
minister, Kareem Waheed, to offer his resignation (Alwan and Fadel 2010, Fadel 2010). Aside 
from electricity and water issues underpinning these protests was a broad sense of 
dissatisfaction with the ongoing political stalemate, now well into its third month. As Iraq’s 
foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, put it ‘People are tired of a lack of services, lack of action, 
and all this debate on television about government formation and positions. The public sense is 
one of anger and tiredness’ (Zebari cited in Al-Jazeera 2010). 
However, no one could have predicted the dramatic sequence of events that would sweep 
across the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and through 2011 as long lasting and 
deeply entrenched regimes fell in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya (Isakhan, et al. 2012). Civil 
movements gained credible if faltering momentum across the region and Iraqis were confronted 
with the failures of their own democracy to deliver on the many promises made to them since 
2003. This led to weeks of scattered protests across Iraq. As with the other protests across the 
Middle East, organizers used Facebook and other social media and new technologies to promote 
the rallies, disseminate opinion and stimulate debate. What differentiated them from protests 
elsewhere was the fact that, while other Middle Eastern protestors focused on 
overthrowing governments, the protests in Iraq mostly addressed issues such as corruption, the 
country’s chronic unemployment and shoddy public services like electricity, and included calls 
for the resignation of provincial governors (Sly 2011). 
These events culminated in the ‘Day of Rage’ (25 February 2011) in which thousands of 
protestors took to the streets in at least 17 separate demonstrations across the country following 
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Friday prayers (Al-Jazeera 2011c, 2011d). In smaller regions such as the southern province of 
Thi-Qar, 10,000 demonstrators gathered with one claiming that such protests ‘proved that there 
is a new factor affecting the state’s policy which is the citizen, who managed to demand his 
rights … [constituting] a real challenge for democracy’ (Al-Jaberi cited in Aswat Al-Iraq 2011). 
Similarly, across the north, tens of thousands of Kurds mimicked protestors in Cairo and 
elsewhere by setting up camp for days on end in central squares, including Al-Saray square in 
Sulaimaniya (Al-Khateeb 2011). Muhammed Tawfeek, a spokesman for Gorran, the Kurdish 
opposition party, claimed that ‘People here are as frustrated as the rest of the Middle East … It’s 
all about democracy, separation of power and clean elections’ (Tawfeek cited in Arango and 
Schmidt 2011). Meanwhile, in Baghdad’s own Tahrir (liberation) square 5,000 protestors 
carrying Iraqi flags and various political banners gathered, chanting ‘No to unemployment. No 
to the liar Maliki’ (cited in Al-Jazeera 2011f). Reporting from Baghdad, Al-Jazeera’s Jane Arraf 
gave the following description of events: 
The protests in Iraq are growing in size, partly because of the instability of the 
coalition government formed by Nouri Al-Maliki, the country’s prime 
minister … Iraqis are increasingly unwilling to accept the nature of the 
democracy that has emerged in years after Saddam’s regime was overthrown 
… This is a new democracy, it’s an unusual democracy, and it’s not exactly 
what people bargained for … On top of that, people are looking around [at] 
protests in Egypt and Tunisia … It has shown them, particularly these young 
people that if they come out and demand their rights, perhaps something will 
happen. (Arraf cited in Al-Jazeera 2011e) 
Unfortunately, key Iraqi political figures such as Maliki and Barzani reacted to these events in 
ways similar to dictators and autocrats across the region: they met Iraqi protests with a mixture 
of brutal suppression and modest political and economic concessions. For his part, Maliki 
offered concessions such as promising to cut his pay in half and to amend the Iraqi constitution 
so that no leader could serve more than two terms (Sly 2011). In terms of suppression, Maliki 
ordered the closure of the offices and newspapers of the Iraqi Nation Party and the Iraqi 
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Communist Party, both of which had been critical in organizing the protests (Schmidt and Healy 
2011). Maliki also ordered a brutal crackdown on the Iraqi protestors, journalists, and civil and 
political activists who have been involved in the events. The ISF and the protestors clashed 
frequently, leading to many arrests, beatings and deaths. In the Kurdish north, Barzani 
employed a similar strategy, sending in a thousand of his Peshmerga militia to quell 
demonstrations that demanded his departure (Al-Khateeb 2011, Al-Laithi 2011). 
 While such developments do not bode well for Iraqi democracy, the protests of the Re-
Colonial period nonetheless indicate the continuing struggle of the Iraqi people towards 
democracy and also shed light on the complex nature of politics post-Saddam. Commenting on 
these events, one anonymous editorial printed in Azzaman at the time of the ‘Day of Rage’ 
protests captures this complexity: 
Iraqis are supposed to have been ‘liberated’ by their U.S. occupiers. They are 
supposed to be enjoying the fruits of their occupation by the world’s most 
powerful nation. They are supposed to have democracy, unlike other Arab 
countries whose nations are rising against their dictators. The U.S., childishly, 
thought it could bring democracy to Iraq … It thought it could bring its own 
lackeys and install them as satraps to rule the country democratically. And 
today, the lackeys it brought with its invasion, who are ruling the country, 
including its semi-independent Kurdish north, find that their own people are 
rising against them the way the people of Libya and other Arab countries are 
revolting against their dictators … Iraqis, who think of themselves as the real 
revolutionaries of the Arab world, are embarrassed and ashamed. They wanted 
to have the change on their own, the way the Egyptians toppled Mubarak’s 
presidency … How glad we the Iraqis would have been if we today, like other 
Arabs, rose against our dictator and had him toppled. We need to remove this 
stigma of shame by overthrowing the lackeys the U.S. brought with it and 




A close inspection of the Re-Colonial period, therefore reveals an unrivalled upsurge in media 
freedoms that have played a central role in promoting a succession of Iraqi elections and 
referendums since 2005. Similarly, the many protest movements that have spread across Iraq in 
the Re-Colonial period have allowed ordinary people to express their concerns or air their 
grievances in a relatively peaceful and democratic way. These indigenous, localized and highly 
co-ordinated media and protest movements reveal the strength of the Iraqi people’s will towards 
democracy and that, when given the opportunity to make this will a reality, they are more than 
capable of utilizing democratic mechanisms independent of foreign interference. They also 
indicate the degree to which democratic practices and culture are familiar to the people of Iraq. 
The Iraqi people implicitly understand that by critiquing their government in the press or by 
taking to the streets to protest key decisions, they are able to hold their democratically elected 
representatives to account. The fact that Iraqi citizens of all ethno-religious persuasions and 
professions have actively utilized the mechanisms of democratic deliberation to effectively 
voice their concerns and influence politics is at odds with the prevailing western view that the 
streets of Iraq are the locus solely of spontaneous acts of violence. 
The Re-Colonial period also contradicts the view that the West has a unique proclivity for 
democracy and the Iraqi people have been able to successfully expose the fallacy of the US’s 
self-appointed mission to bring democracy to the Middle East. The argument can be made that 
whatever its shortcomings, democracy exists in Iraq today because Iraqis demanded it, not 
because US idealists imposed it. Together, the actions of both the US and the Iraqi people 
during the recent past assert an alternative history of Iraq, an alternative history that is written 
each day by the many Iraqis who are deeply concerned with the future of their nation. 
 
 
